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Chapter 6
Planets
The Net of the World Market
Whoever today says `capital' says `globalisation.' For nothing has been more
central to the current restructuring of corporate power than nomadic range of manoeuvre,
deterritorialisation from old centres, systematic subversion of national sovereignty, and
planetary political planning. And whoever today says ` globalisation' says also
`communication,' for the emergence of this new world order would be unthinkable without
the telecommunications and computer networks that now form the electronic pathways for
the circulation of money, commodities and power.
Despite the breathlessness of so much contemporary commentary, these
developments represent the culmination of an old logic. Marx in his time saw clearly how
capitalism's compulsion to expand production and circulation drove it to successive
geographic enlargements of a circuit whose circumference would eventually encircle the
whole earth, leading to "the entanglement of all peoples in the net of the world market."1
Observing the telegraphs, railways and steamships of his age, he observed how capital "by
its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier" so that "the creation of the physical
conditions of exchange--of the means of communication and transport--the annihilation of
space by time--becomes an extraordinary necessity for it."2
Marx believed this creation of  “intercourse in every direction, universal inter-
dependence of all nations” had both exploitative and emancipatory aspects.3  On the one
hand, the “immensely facilitated means of communication” provided the means by which
capital imposed its logic worldwide. It
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compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of
production; compels them to introduce what it calls civilisation into their
midst, i.e. to become bourgeois themselves.4
But simultaneously, this process created the conditions for the success of revolutionary
proletarian movements, movements that depended on the “ever-expanding union of the
workers”;
This union is helped by the improved means of communication that are
created by modern industry and that place workers of different localities in
contact with one another. It was just this contact that was needed to
centralise the numerous local struggles, all of the same character, into one
national struggle between classes.5
Today the net of the world market is made of fibre optic cables and satellite links. Yet few
see in its weaving the dialectical possibilities Marx perceived.  Mainstream theorists of `
globalisation’ of course simply celebrate the market-driven march of what they call
“civilisation” across of the face the planet. But while there have recently been several
important critical analyses from a broadly Marxian perspective, nearly all see the recent
intensifications in the transnational organisation of production, exchange and finance, and
the accompanying developments in new media and communications technologies, only as
massively enhancing the power of transnational corporations.6
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This chapter takes a different tack. It proposes that globalisation, rather than simply
representing an inexorable deepening of capitalist control, constitutes a defensive
corporate response to series of interweaving challenges that in the 1960s and 70s plunged
the international structure of accumulation into crisis. Moreover, while the immediate
impact of this riposte was to profoundly disarray oppositional forces, it has also opened
unforeseen opportunities for their new co-operation and alliance. Not the least of these is
the use of global capital's own means of communication and transport to connect a
proliferating array of counter-movements whose own world-encircling activities of
resistance and reconstruction I term `the other globalisation.'7
 Three Worlds Into One
Capitalism’s global expansion has constantly been spurred on by the rebellions of
its labouring subjects. Historically, these struggles have spiralled across a succession of
expanding territorial spaces: the national space, where capital was first challenged by
emergent proletarian movements; the imperial space, where these challenges were partly
defused by capital's capacity to raise domestic living standards on the basis of colonial
super-exploitation; the socialist space, where Bolshevism, in the midst of inter-imperial
war seized a terrain within which it was then fatally contained. By the mid-point of the
twentieth century, however, the catastrophes of inter-imperial war, the threat of state
socialism and the mounting pressures of anti-colonial liberation propelled capital towards
its first exercises in truly international planning.
These took shape at the end of World War II. Under the leadership of a newly pre-
eminent US industry, whose most advanced corporations were rapidly transcending the
limits of the domestic market to acquire multinational form, the management of the
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capitalist world economy began for the first time to be directed and orchestrated by an
array of consciously global institutions. Trading arrangements were codified in the Bretton
Woods treaties; significant financial controls delegated to the World Bank and IMF;
monetary stability assured by the dollar's role in regulating exchange rates; and the whole
system held in place militarily by the Pentagon's nuclear might, relayed through various
local authorities and regional alliances. The Fordist golden age of capital thus rested not
only on the domestic planning of national economies, but also on an unprecedented level of
international organisation.
The famous tripartite division of First, Second and Third World describes the
success of this international order in segregating the global proletariat into zones of
differential control. For the inhabitants of the First World, there was an historic experiment
in welfare state reformism. For the populace of the socialist bloc, the Second World, there
was Cold War encirclement and forced industrialisation. And for the Third World, there
was a transition from colonial subordination to European capital to neocolonial penetration
by US based multinationals, with modernisation programs courtesy of the Rockefeller
Foundation, counter-insurgency from the CIA, and ongoing mass immiseration. The
workers of the world were in effect segregated and exiled to three separate planets with
drastically different levels of development and radically incommensurable experiences of
work, exploitation, and struggle.
Over the next twenty-five years, however, the stability of this international order
was shaken by rebellions converging from different directions. In the Third World, the
arrangement was in trouble from the start, as successive revolutionary movements--in
China, Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam --fought and won against the sentence of dependency.
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Ironically, at the same time as Third World movements were establishing state socialist
regimes, in the Soviet-bloc Second World the initial rapid growth produced by forced
labour stagnated, leading to bread riots and rebellion against police control. Finally, in the
First World metropolis, the Keynesian deal started to come apart in the 1960s and 70s.
Supposedly affluent workers, instead of being pacified by higher living standards, used
these as resources to pursue new levels of struggle, that  rolled from inner city ghettos to
industrial shop floors to university campuses setting off a sequence of mutually reinforcing
reverberations.8
As Harry Cleaver points out, struggles arising in the different zones of the world
system started to circulate.9 Metropolitan capital had relied on cheap resources from
colonial and neo-colonial dominions to finance its deals with the mass worker. As anti-
colonial wars ruptured this control, this domestic latitude of manoeuvre was diminished.
The inflationary effects of the Vietnam conflict, in particular, set in chain a whole series of
wage and social wage struggles. Moreover, struggles across the planet began to support
one another. Third World revolutions inspired social activists in the metropolis, and were
supported in turn by international solidarity movements.10 In the US, and to a lesser degree
in Europe, opposition to the Vietnam war movement brought on massive internal turmoil.
By the early 1970s, it became clear that, from capital's point of view, the old
`triplanetary' division of the world wasn't working.11 With profit rates in the old centres of
accumulation tumbling, the search for a reorganisation of capital's global circuits that
would allow it to escape world-wide pressures of social unrest was on, both in the probes
and experiments of individual corporations and banks, and in the consultations of high-
level capitalist planning agencies such as the Trilateral Commission. The US government's
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abrogation of the Bretton Woods currency agreement in 1971 was a first signal of the
abandonment of the post-war international settlement, a departure deepened a few years
later with the dramatic redirection of finances and investment occasioned by the first oil
shock.12
In 1975, Mario Montano argued that what was taking shape was a restructuring that
would render previous theories of `development' and `underdevelopment' obsolete. As
general capitalist strategies, both underdevelopment and development had failed. For
multinational capital, the question now was “ how to directly oppose development and
underdevelopment against each other, how to make underdevelopment work completely
inside development.”13
What was unfolding, Montano suggested, was an undoing of the traditional demarcations by
"two opposing dynamics": on the one hand, the "underdevelopment of development "--with
the "Latin Americanisation" of the US and Europe--and, on the other a "development of
underdevelopment," with the industrialisation of portions of the former Third World.14 The
aim of this restructuring was to pit "the starvation of underdevelopment . . . against the
living standards of the working class of the metropolis."15
While Montana’s analysis was necessarily preliminary, it accurately defines the
main thrust of the process that is today known as ` globalisation.' To destroy the multiplying
threats to its international command, capital has broken out from its old entrenchments,
overrun the previous divisions of its world system, and, empowered by its new digital
technologies, opened up the whole planet as a field for manoeuvre. In doing so, it has
imploded the Three Worlds into one another. Corporate flight from the demands of the
mass worker in Europe and North America has led to the partially Third-Worlding of the
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First World--deindustrialising manufacturing centres, cancelling the Keynesian deal,
inaugurating mass unemployment, lowering wages, intensifying work. This has introduced
into the metropolis levels of insecurity and destitution previously thought of as relegated to
the peripheries of capitalist world economy.
The other side of this coin, the selective First-Worlding of the Third World, has
equally taken its impetus from the urgent need--mediated through a variety of authoritarian
local regimes—to modernise out of existence the threat of revolutionary insurgency. Thus
the turbulent energies of immiserated labour of the periphery have been harnessed to the
creation of various growth sites--the Newly Industrialising Countries and other
development zones--whose appearance controverts cruder models of perpetual
dependency. The drive to eliminate the twin nemesis of the industrial wildcatter and the
peasant guerrilla links the deindustrialised rustbelts of the North and the new shantytowns
of the South in a complementary logic.
At the same time the one supposed alternative to capitalist development and
underdevelopment --the Second World of state socialism--has blown apart and its residues
been allocated between the two poles. Retrospectively, it is clear that the capitalist
restructuring of the 1970s sounded a death knell for the command economies of the Soviet
bloc. The rigidities of their internal controls proved altogether unable to adapt to the
flexibilities requisite for microelectronic, post-Fordist production. When these converging
pressures exploded in a series of popular uprisings across Eastern Europe and the USSR in
1989, neoliberalism's market managers rode the wave, channelling movements
characterised by an immense diversity of aspirations into marketisation and economic
shock therapy. Where state socialist regimes have survived, as in China, it is only by
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bringing to bloom their already present tendencies to act simply as versions of
authoritarian capitalism.
The result is the creation of an increasingly smooth and planar world-space of
accumulation. The polarities of `development' and `underdevelopment' of course still exist
--indeed are massively intensified. And, it is important to emphasise, their distribution
continues to fall preponderantly on either side of a North/South axis. But at the same time
these poles increasingly designate possibilities of ascendant affluence or abysmal misery
that can be visited on any point in the planet according to the movement of corporate
investment. Inner city ghettos in North America attain `Third World' infant mortality rates,
while cities such as Sao Paulo, Seoul or Taipei begin to burgeon with a cosmopolitan
affluence matching the one time `First World.' It is beyond the scope of this thesis to
analyse the full unwinding of this transformation, especially since many of its aspects have
been very adequately addressed elsewhere. What I want to indicate here is the way in
which it has been dependent on a massive expansion of the means of communication, and in
particular on the development of computers and telecommunications.
Re-Dividing the International Labourer
At the basis of capitalist globalisation is the "new international division of
labour."16 This comes into being as capital both flees from and undermines strongly
organised, and consequently costly, strata of working class power--metropolitan, male,
industrial--by gaining access to more vulnerable sectors--peripheral, female, domestic,
cheapened by destitution and authoritarian discipline.
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US employers have repeatedly responded to cycles of working class struggle with
waves of investment abroad.17 From the mid-1960s on, this pattern was repeated, not only
by US companies but also by European and Japanese corporations, on an extraordinary
scale and across an unprecedented range of industries. From the relocation of car
production to sites in Warsaw, Tehran and Brazil, through the shift of light assembly
industries to the free trade zones of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and South Korea, to the
emergence of Mexican and Latin American maquiladoras and the creation of industrial
enclaves in post-socialist China and Eastern Europe, this process has proceeded at an
accelerating rate. It involves not only smokestack industrial plant but also sunrise
microelectronics enterprises. Already it has rendered traditional divisions between
metropolitan industry and peripheral hinterland largely obsolete.18
This geographical reorganisation of labour power has also involved a radical
reworking of the gendered division of labour. For the corporate search for inexpensive and
reliable labour has largely entailed a switch from male factory hands to the supposedly
docile and disposable female `nimble fingers' employed in, say, the garment industries of
the Mexican maquiladoras or the microchip assembly of the Malaysian enterprise zones.
Much of this female labour is organised so as to labour at home, in isolation, while still
performing unpaid domestic work in support of male labour power. The global assembly
line of many industries--electronics, textiles, light engineering--is thus to a remarkable
extent a homework economy, linking transnational contractors and subcontractors in long,
shifting chains whose complexity hides responsibility for the abysmal conditions of the
new home/factories.
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This global spread of female "shadow work" has even darker aspects. Silvia
Federici, Mariarosa Dalla Costa and Maria Mies and others argue that globalisation takes
its impetus not only from business's attempts to escape the militancy of the industrial mass
workers, but also from its flight from, and capitalisation on, the First World feminist revolt
against reproductive labour work. The transnational explosion of the sex trade,
pornography industry, mail order bride business and baby adoption market all represent
"enormous quotas of reproduction work which capital has exported in the same way that
there has been a strategy of exporting part of the manufacturing process with the free
enterprise zones."19
All these strategic relocations depend on highly developed systems of
transportation and communication. Electronic information systems in particular allow
transnational corporations to decentralise operations while centralising control; executives
in Toronto offices open on-screen windows displaying the performance of machine
operators in Seoul factories.20 Manufacturing strategies for products such as Ford's `world
car' rely on telecommunications to co-ordinate production flows at plants on different
continents, perfect standardisation of modularised parts, fast, cheap transportation, and
computerised automation carried to a point where elementary units and simple routines can
be performed by unskilled workers. Global homework industries, such as those of
Benetton, network computers to tie suppliers to sellers, match production to inventories,
monitor dispersed workers, and check quality and speed of supply through every rung of
their hierarchy. The same logic, to greater or lesser degree, is in play in the processes that
allow Canadian supermarkets to sell fresh-cut flowers from Africa, or travel agencies in
Bonn and Tokyo to book sex tours in Thailand and the Philippines. In all areas, even though
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production remains dependent on the most arduous, protracted physical labour--in Mexican
car plants, Kenyan agribusiness plantations or Bangkok brothels--co-ordination and control
is effected through communication flows moving over distances and at speeds that surpass
corporeal horizons.
Global Hearts and Minds
The global restructuring of production is complemented by an equally global
reorganisation of consumption. As we saw in the last chapter, this is necessitated by
capital's very success in driving down the wage and social benefits of metropolitan mass
workers--for this undermined mass consumption within the domestic markets of the First
World. Increasingly, therefore, business has turned its eyes to export markets and,
increasingly toward the population masses of the South. These are so great in numbers that
if even a relatively small proportion--the managerial and professional strata benefiting
most directly from industrialisation--can be brought into the orbit of luxury consumer
capitalism, it will more than counter-balance the eroded spending power of Northern
workers.21 And for industries whose goods can be sold cheaply enough to penetrate the
youthful economies of South African townships and Latin American barrios--cigarettes,
soft drinks, cassettes--the potential profits are prodigious.
However, such a global projection of consumerism into zones previously entirely
relegated to economic marginality demands a reconstruction of needs and desires--of
cultural traditions, religious prohibitions, dietary habits, sexual mores, traditions of self-
sufficiency --similar to that experienced by the Euro-American proletariat in the first part
of the twentieth century, but exceeding it in scale. In this process the vanguard
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organisations are the great media corporations--characterised by concentrated ownership,
vertical and horizontal integration, and mastery of world-spanning arrays of convergent
technologies. These "lords of the global village" are no longer--as in the classic
formulations of the `cultural imperialism' thesis--exclusively North American.22 Although
US entertainment and information corporations still generally enjoy a pre-eminent position,
these industries have themselves, to a degree, become globalised, and also include
European, Japanese and even Latin American interests; newly-marketised Moscow's most
popular soap opera, "Even the Rich Cry," was made in Brazil.
But, whatever their ownership, these corporations--Adorno and Horkheimer's
"culture industry" gone planetary--have become the vital agents for a reconstruction of
global subjectivity carried out in the interests of transnational capital. Their products--
films, programs, music, videos--are quintessentially global commodities, instantaneously
broadcastable, evanescent, and demanding vast, worldwide audiences in order to recoup
the costs and risks of production. Globalisation means that everywhere, all the time, it is
"video night in Kathmandu," as the habits of media spectatorship are stimulated and
implanted worldwide.23
These media commodities in turn provide the vehicle for the global marketing
campaigns. During the 1960s and 1970s, the penetration of television to households all
over the world had provided multinational corporations with the necessary communication
infrastructure to carry out co-ordinated advertising in Europe, Canada, Latin America and
Asia.24 In the 1980s such global marketing strategies, promoted by business management
gurus such as Theodore Levitt, became the creed of major advertising agencies.25 These
strategies are supported both by powerful campaigns to compel developing countries to lift
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restrictions on advertising and by the deployment of technologies that can effectively
overleap any such barriers. Carried by satellite beam and VCR to the villages of Indonesia,
Zaire and Colombia, Arnold Schwartzeneger and Pamela Lee perform as the simulacral
storm troopers of consumer revolutions dedicated to the attractions of soft drinks, hard
bodies, high-tech weapons and high-cut swim suits.
However, this universalisation of advertising also goes hand in hand with
intensifying segmentation and stratification of markets. Assuming that consumer elites in
New York, Rio de Janeiro, Paris and Bombay will have more in common with each other
than with the homeless who in each city swarm on the adjacent blocks, the agencies deploy
ever more sophisticated technological resources for surveillance of the world's
consumption zones. They also carefully modulate centrally planned campaigns in the light
of detailed anthropological, ethnographic and market research. Arif Dirlik reports a paean
from an advocate of this "guerrilla marketing" who declares that "just as the guerrilla
fighter must know the terrain of struggle in order to control it, so it is with the multinational
corporation of today. Our terrain is the world." This business-administration "guerrilla"
goes onto claim that the "world market is now being computer micromapped" into 304
geographical consumption zones cross-referenced with the "unconscious" needs 507
microconsumption types:
Through an extension of this mapping, even the most autonomous and
unconventional desires may be reconstructed for the benefit of market
extension and control . . . we must win hearts and minds. This task can be
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accomplished by constructing and reconstructing them all the way down in
what can only be viewed as an endless process.26
While the cutting edge of this "hearts and minds" campaign remains the standardised
Hollywood style of infotainment, media conglomerates also collect themes from all over
planet--world music, ethnic arts, Third World cinema--for conversion into commodities
and marketing instruments. The relentless monoculture of Disney and MTV is leavened
with multicultural traces of Taiwanese rice farming chants and Indian bhangra dancing.
This eclecticism has led some observers of popular culture to enthusiastic celebrations of
the diversity and hybridisation of the newly cosmopolitan global bazaar.27
It is true that, as Marx observed, the world market brings with it a variegation and
elaboration of needs and appetites. In a way it does open up new horizons and subjective
possibilities. But what too many contemporary panegyrics to this process overlook is the
relentless uniformity of the logic underlying this process, the enormous systematicity that
precedes all the apparent differentiation. The order of this system is unequivocal. Every
human aspiration, desire and creative impulse shall find their place within the commodity-
form: those that refuse are condemned to oblivion.
Money in Command, World Wide
With globalisation, capital cracks the shell of the nation state. In its Fordist era,
national governments had been indispensable for planning and securing the social
conditions of accumulation--by Keynesianism in the First World, by neo-colonial
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modernisation in the Third. However, the struggles of the 1960s and 70s threatened these
arrangements. To varying degrees, ranging from revolutionary power-seizures in the Third
World to First World "fiscal crises," social movements undermined business's control of
public spending.28 Capital's reply was to relocate social control outside the national
sphere. Over the last decade, a round of regional and global trade agreements--NAFTA,
Maastricht, GATT, the establishment of the World Trade Organisation--have subordinated
national policy to supranational agreements favouring unrestricted mobility of capital,
deregulation, privatisation and unfettered markets. But such agreements in many ways
merely formalise and consolidate a level of a transnational discipline which capital had
already won earlier in the globalisation process, through another mechanism--that of the
international financial markets.
Since the 1960s, these markets have undergone an explosive expansion. This is the
result of a number of factors: the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement and the
establishment of floating exchange; the growing importance of offshore or stateless money,
such as Eurodollars; the deregulation and restructuring of banking, stock exchanges and
financial institutions; the invention of ever-more arcane methods of speculation; and the
increasing powers allocated to world-level financial institutions such as the IMF and the
World Bank. As Arthur MacEwan points out, what is new in this situation is not the
importance and interdependence of financial flows for capital, but their degree of
integration, speed of transaction and capacity to escape state control.29
Again, these developments are inseparable from the expansion of information
technology, that  has "probably changed banking and finance more than any other sector of
the capitalist economy."30 Computers and telecommunications accelerate financial flows
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phenomenally, permitting round-the-clock planet-wide investment activity, reducing the
costs of transfers, creating a common digital medium for transactions and spurring mergers
and consolidations amongst monetary institutions. In a sector where a few seconds advance
knowledge over competitors can translate into billion-dollar profits, information systems
are hardly less sophisticated than those governing nuclear weaponry. Indeed, as one
observer of electronic trading says, "Its almost like modern warfare, where people sit in
bunkers and . . . push buttons and things happen."31
This world of virtual finance has become both increasingly detached from and
superordinate over material production. As the struggles of the 60s and 70s unfolded,
financial trading became very important to capital as an escape from crisis. Faced with
loss of control in the shop floor and the paddy fields, many commercial interests simply
evacuated the corporeal world, with its mud, blood and recalcitrant labour power, taking
flight not merely by seeking new sites for production but by dematerialising themselves
entirely into speculative activity. This migration of money into cyberspace left behind a
mundane spoor of abandoned factories and ruined communities and was a major factor in
the mounting toll of job loss that  undermined labour's capacity to oppose capital.
In other ways, too, the money markets became crucial in driving down social
expenses to a level where investment in tangible production would be profitable again.
Previously, the financial levers of domestic economies had rested predominantly in the
hands of national governments. But when governments failed to discipline their workers,
global money bypassed such arrangements. With the valuation of national currencies,
interest rates and credit worthiness determined by international investors and speculators,
economic control became immanent within the entire planetary finance system.
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Governments--national, regional and municipal--that had previously squared the demands
of business and worker's movements by running up deficits now found the continuation of
their credit and the stability of their currencies conditional on the implementation of
austerity programs. As Christian Marazzi puts it,
the need to preserve credit ratings and currency stability has narrowed in an
unprecedented way the margins of manoeuvre--the "relative autonomy"--of
national states, to the extent of dramatically reducing the area of choice
within which national policies has to operate. All governments and their
oppositions have in this sense been pulled into the narrow area of choice
imposed by the logic of international monetary austerity.32
More and more vital areas of domestic policy are subjected to what Cleaver terms
"international adjustment mechanisms virtually invisible to the average worker."33
The full enormity of this monetary discipline is of course seen in the "structural
adjustment programmes" (SAPs) inflicted by the World Bank and IMF on Third and
Second World states unable to pay for the large-scale national development programs of
the 1970s.34 However, the debt crisis is not restricted to economies formally placed under
the protectorate of the IMF. Indeed, what is remarkable about globalisation is the way in
which the pressure of the money markets has resulted in the spontaneous adoption of SAP-
style measures within the very heart of the former First World. From the New York deficit
crisis of 1975-76, through the rampage of Reaganite and Thatcherite monetarist policy in
the US and Britain, to the retreat of Mitterand's socialism in France in 1982 in the face of
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financial pressure, to the gutting of the New Zealand and Canadian welfare states in the
name of deficit reduction, the imperatives of world money have dictated policies of
deregulation, privatisation, wage cutting and welfare reduction adopted regardless of
parliamentary regimes' ostensible political coloration. By lifting financial control out of the
hands of domestic governments and diffusing it through the electronic nodes of global
exchanges, capital has effectively placed economic power in a stratospheric orbit where it
cannot be reached by electoral choices taken within the confines of the nation state. It thus
raises to a new level the negation of democracy inherent in the private expropriation of the
means of production.
The Resurrection of War
However, the ultimate disciplinary instrument of the world market is, as it has
always been, force. War is always critical to capitalist control, as a means for extending
its circuits over new domains, dividing opposition, and destroying any threat to the
operations of the market. It is therefore hard to overestimate the significance of the series
of military reverses inflicted on capital by revolutionary movements from 1945 on--in
Korea, China, Algeria, Cuba, Mozambique, Rhodesia, Angola, and, most seriously,
Vietnam, where the pre-eminent imperial power went down to defeat, partly due to the
disaffection of its own populace.
An important part of capital's restructuring has thus been the resurrection of military
power as a viable instrument of global command. Amidst privatisation and deregulation,
one of the few aspects of the capitalist state generally reinforced is the security apparatus.
In the US, which retains its position as the principle enforcer for the world market, the
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Pentagon has carefully investigated ways to circumvent the unwillingness of citizens to
sacrifice themselves in foreign wars. This experimentation has followed two routes. On the
one hand, there has been a development of high-tech weaponry--Cruise Missiles, Star
Wars systems, first strike nuclear missiles, Stealth bombers--capable of fighting highly
automated, remote-control wars. On the other, there is increasing resort to the low-
intensity, covert, proxy or mercenary strategies practised in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Namibia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua.35
In both strategies, command, control, communication and intelligence capacities are
vital. Whether in the `black' satellite systems beaming CIA messages from Virginia to the
rain forests of Costa Rica and Cambodia, or the artificial intelligences unwinkingly
monitoring the earth via the orbital platforms of the Strategic Defence Initiative, the new
forms of warfare demand omnipresent surveillance, near-instantaneous transmission and
precision-targeting. The search for global battlefield supremacy brings to bloom some of
the most exotically deadly technological orchids of the information age. At the same time,
control of information has also assumed a new prominence on the domestic front. Haunted
by the belief that the Vietnam War was lost to the television viewers of America, the
Pentagon and its allies have devoted increasing thought to the control of public opinion in
time of crisis. The fruit of these deliberations appeared in the Malvinas war, the bombing
of Libya, and the invasions of Grenada and Panama. Here it was demonstrated that regimes
of commercial-style image-management, military marketing, press-pool control,
censorship, blackout and propaganda, combined with the extreme swiftness of operations
permitted by massive technological advantage, could largely stifle domestic dissent.
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The real flowering of these developments, had, however, to await the Persian Gulf
War. Here, as Hamid Mowlana says, "the propaganda and communication strategy
surrounding the conduct of war entered a new dimension not seen in previous conflicts."36
Acting as the mercenary agent of multinational capital, the US terminated the disturbance
its former Iraqi client threatened to inflict on the world oil supply by an overwhelming
application of information power. Smart weaponry, superior intelligence gathering, radar
jamming, stealth technologies, the infiltration of computer viruses and the annihilation of
enemy radar systems gave the Allied forces total battlefield superiority. Meanwhile, a
massive media campaign, including fabricated `incubator babies' stories, round-the-clock
press conferences and bulletins, in-field interviews and orchestrated displays of patriotic
fervour aimed to win domestic and international support for the war. This was
complemented by the targeting of Iraq's civilian telecommunications and other information
utilities, depriving its government of equivalent weapons in the propaganda war. In short,
front and home lines were interconnected in a near-seamless regime of information control.
Indeed in a sense, the whole war, with its spectacularly excessive violence, can be
understood as an act of communication. For the message sent to the world by way of
bombsight videos was that any interference in the finely tuned balances and flows of the
world market would be crushed with lightning force. It is no coincidence that President
Bush's announcement of a `new world order,' widely understood as signalling not merely a
diplomatic, but also a politico-economic dispensation, should follow on the heels of the
Persian Gulf War. For the underlying logic of globalisation is that of war--a war waged by
capital to annihilate all points of opposition and permit the relaunching of a new cycle of
accumulation.
309
 Globalisation as Class Decomposition
The creed of globalised capital is clearly enunciated by Robert Reich, economic
advisor and former Labour Secretary to the Clinton administration, in his The Work of
Nations: Preparing Ourselves For 21st Century Capitalism.37 Today, Reich argues, wealth
generation is entirely dependent on "nomadic corporations" that, having fully transcended
any national base exist only as "global enterprise webs" held together by the threads of
computers, fax, phone and video networks.38 Nation states' capacities to control their own
destiny is restricted to the creation of infrastructures--such as information highways--
attractive to the investment by these mobile corporations. The result is to replace capital's
previous territorial divisions of the workforce with an increasingly transnational hierarchy
of labour power. Those countries, or regions, or cities that can render themselves
hospitable in this way will attract well paying "symbolic analytic" jobs--the knowledge-
based work associated with the design and development of new technologies. Those that
don't will become the dumping grounds for the unfortunate industrial and routine service
workers destined to be devalued by automation and global cheap labour.
Reich, to his credit, expresses considerable anxieties about how this divisive logic
will effect the social fabric of the US, as privileged "symbolic analysts" retreat into
fortified enclaves to escape the deepening misery of unemployed service and industrial
classes. The rest of the world, however, hardly figures in his optic. But his overall
perspective on globalisation is both inevitablistic and optimistic. The accumulation of
wealth permitted by enhanced trade and specialisation, although unevenly divided, will
eventually raise global living standards by an inexorable trickle down process. Even those
areas fated to receive the industrial work cast off by the most advanced sectors of capital
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will be better off than in their previous agrarian situation. Globalisation is, Reich insists,
not a zero-sum game but rather an "infinitely expanding terrain of human skills and
knowledge."39
He is quite correct about the astounding wealth-generating effects of contemporary
technology and trade. But his analysis omits the dimension of power--the strategic logic
inherent in capitalist globalisation. By expanding the division of labour, the capitalist
enlargement of the world market allows huge increases in productivity. But it also expands
the division of labourers--the degree to which capital can set workers in competition with
each other and thereby seize for itself an ever-increasing proportion of this global wealth.
The social surplus grows--but so, and probably to an ever-greater extent, does capital's
capacity to expropriate that surplus. The "infinite terrain" over which capitalist
globalisation expands is thus not one of "human skills and knowledge" but of inhuman
profit and exploitation.
By seeking out and putting in competition with one another pools of labour power
previously inaccessible or isolated because of geographical distance, state regulation or
communal self-sufficiency, capital can repeat a classic strategy--creation of a reserve army
of the unemployed, now realised on a world scale. In this context, the nomadism afforded
corporations by the "global webs" means that demands for the maintenance, let alone
improvement, of wages and social conditions, can be circumvented and outflanked.
Workers are faced with the choice of acceding to corporate requirements, or seeing the
now lighter-than-air means of production--software programs and communication nodes--
relocated elsewhere. There is set in train what Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello term a
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"race to the bottom" whereby workers across the world are compelled to cheapen
themselves into a job by competitively lowering their wages and conditions.40
Thus, although the new mobility of investment shuffles and reshuffles relative
positions in the hierarchy of labour with extraordinary rapidity, its overall drive is toward
increased power for capital vis a vis the global proletariat as a whole. Reich is right that
globalisation has given some knowledge workers, largely male, largely white, associated
with high tech, finance, communication and information an exceptional importance.
Concentrated in the technopoles that form the hubs of "global webs," these constitute a
layer of privileged labour on whose loyalty capital can largely rely. But analysis that sees
"symbolic analysts" as the crucial actors in globalisation does not grasp the speed with
which capital turfs yuppies from the lifeboat when cheaper replacements can be found.41
Even symbolic analysts feel the blast of globalisation, as North American computer
programmers are undercut by Lithuanian or Indian competition, and architects, engineers
and professors discover that those who can telecommute can always be teleterminated by
cheaper services uploaded from anywhere on the planet.42 The ultimate benefactors of
globalisation are not even the symbolic analysts, but the power that  Reich hardly
mentions--that of transnational capital itself.
Beneath the symbolic analysts are the mass of industrial and service workers
exposed to increasing insecurity by a mobility of investment that can send jobs catapulting
from Oregon to Lima to Jakarta in a matter of weeks. This logic has, so far, primarily been
applied against industrial workers in the North--to the temporary benefit of labour in
selected growth areas such as East Asia. However this undercutting is a process that can
be repeated universally. Workers in Mexico or South Korea who have unionised find their
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jobs shifted to Bangladesh or Indonesia or China--and when labour there organises, the
work moves on to Vietnam.43 Latin Americans see investment prospects vanish towards
Eastern Europe. Indeed, at points the deindustrialising process comes full circle, by
creating in the old metropolitan areas zones of immiseration so deep that they then become
low wage areas which lure capital back from its flight to the one-time periphery: Scotland
and Ireland are now attracting Japanese and Korean investment with industrial wage levels
comparable to those in parts of Asia.
At the bottom of the new global hierarchy, in regions and cultures that do not match
capital's requirements in terms of wages, work habits, or possession of desirable natural
resources, lie the hapless surplus reservoirs of labour power, labelled `not wanted on
voyage' in capital's round-the-world restructuring.44These populations, still predominantly
but not exclusively in the South, uprooted from the land by agribusiness and IMF
agricultural rationalisation, but by-passed by the electronic paths through which the world
market circulates wealth, survive through the networks of the drug trade, prostitution, body
parts sales, exotic animal trade, arms smuggling and other informal economies. To the
degree these desperate measures fail, they fall through the holes of the network into an
abyss of impoverishment and debasement that is a breeding ground for ethnic, nationalist
and religious wars, in Somalia, Liberia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, or Bosnia. From these
catastrophe-zones the victims will only be rescued by international `peace-keeping'
interventions when the level of chaos threatens to become uncontainable or interfere with
serious investment opportunities.
 Their fate--relayed by real time satellite broadcasts of famine and street fighting--
serve as an admonishment to others in more fortunate places not to demand too much, to
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buckle down, work harder, be grateful for what they have. Such scenes, whether from
Mogadishu, Sarajevo, Kabul, Monrovia, Grozny or South Central Los Angeles, are not
incidental to capitalist globalisation. They are essential to it. For they represent the
ultimate outcome of a strategy of decomposition that  empowers capital by intensifying the
world wide competition between workers--dividing labour from itself in a process whose
culmination is an internecine violence.
 Globalisation as Recomposition
The terrible efficiency of this disintegrative strategy should not be minimised. Yet
analysis that understands globalisation only as capitalist triumph is incomplete. For one of
the remarkable features of the last decade is the way in which unexpected currents of
opposition have started to emerge from the transformed conditions created by
transnationalisation. Often these new vortices of subversion have started to spin precisely
where the victory of the market forces was thought most complete, as in Mexico, where the
Zapatista's challenge to the showcase of neoliberal development has caught the imagination
of the world.
As I discussed in the previous chapter, the scope of contemporary capitalist
subsumption means that such movements of opposition will no longer be found
concentrated at the immediate point of production but spill across society as a whole.
Battles against corporate globalisation involve waged workers, but also unwaged labour:
women's organisations resisting the deconstruction of welfare services, students opposing
the slashing of public spending, movements of indigenous and peasant people fighting
eviction from the land, rural and urban communities refusing the ecological devastation of
314
hazardous waste dumps and hydro-electric development projects. The very diversity of
these resistances, and the real nature of the contradictions that  often divide them, makes the
problems of their co-operation and co-ordination enormous, even on the scale of a
neighbourhood, city or region; when viewed internationally, these obstacles might appear
insuperable.
And yet the new counter-movements are making trans-sectoral and transnational
interconnections. In part, this is happening because capital's very success in creating for
itself a worldwide latitude of action is dissolving some of the barriers that previously
separated oppositional movements geographically. In collapsing the Three Worlds into a
single plane of accumulation, capital has introduced from one to the other forms of work,
dispossession and struggle that were previously segregated. Thus the spread of large-scale
manufacturing into Korea, Brazil or South Africa results in the emergence of mass-worker
struggles of a sort that were once distinctively metropolitan while the deindustrialisation of
the United States and Europe is in turn accompanied by social movements resembling those
of the `underdeveloped' world; many authors have noted the similarities between the 1992
Los Angeles riots and Latin American urban insurrections.45 More generally, the global
imposition of neoliberal policies has created commonalties of experience for waged and
unwaged labour from Warsaw to Cairo, as the destruction of public services and the
subjugation of government to supranational financial flows, increasingly come to constitute
a shared lexicon of proletarian existence.46
This exchange of experience is intensified by the vast flows of migrants and
refugees set in motion by Third World industrialisation, war and environmental
catastrophes. Moving legally and illegally, this huge movement of peoples has converted
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world cities into crucibles of cosmopolitan experimentation, confounding, confusing and
confronting long-held ethnocentric and colonialist perspectives. Capital everywhere tries
to harness these exiles as yet another source of cheapened labour, making them the "new
helots" of globalisation.47 Yet migrant workers--Turkish autoworkers in Germany, Filipino
nannies and Punjabi farmworkers in Canada, Mexican drywallers and janitors in
California--also carry with them traditions of struggle, and often stand at the heart of new
militancies. They challenge the racism of established trades unions and social movements,
and establish new lines of international connection.48
Moreover--and this is the point to which the remainder of our analysis will be
devoted--capital's own diffusion of the means of communication has inadvertently assisted
this connective process. In creating the pathways for its own transnational circuit, it has
unintentionally opened the routes for a global contraflow of news, dialogue, controversy
and support between movements in different parts of the planet. To a degree, the very
communication channels that circulate commodities also circulate struggles. Despite all the
well-known filtering and censorship mechanisms, corporate and state media do carry
abbreviated scenes and news of class conflicts across the world. Sometimes--as in the
case of the Israeli invasion of Beirut, or the Indonesian genocide in East Timor--shots of a
riot, bombing, or a massacre have been crucial in mobilising transnational support for
resistances that , in a purely national context, face overwhelming odds. However, to a large
extent connections and dialogue between globally distant resistant movements depends on
the construction of counter-networks, that  while drawing on the technologies and expertise
diffused by the world market, reconstruct them into radically new configurations.
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Thus, while the effect of globalisation has often been to more intensely divide
workers within a given city, region or nation, it has, paradoxically, also created the
possibility of building alliances across city, regional and national boundaries. Writing of
the transnational linkages established by the indigenous people’s movements, Mariarosa
Dalla Costa has spoken of how,
Workers and non-natives, ecological movement militants, women's groups,
and human rights activists have been attracted into complex support actions,
helping and monitoring from various parts of the world.
In this process, she says, a "hinterland of communication and liaison has been constructed .
. . across the Americas and in the world":
Relations of analysis and information have been more clearly and more
strongly interwoven. And all this has become the primary tissue for
communication between and action by different sectors in the working
social body.49
Dalla Costa speaks of a growing "tissue of communication between and action by different
sectors in the working social body." This tissue creates connections that run counter to the
decompositional logic of capitalist globalisation. Somewhere between the ethereal
activism of radio and computer networks, and the weary odysseys of proletarians trekking
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from San Salvador to Vancouver or from Manila to Kuwait City, a new global class
composition is being born.
Radiating the Information of Struggle
More than twenty years ago, the autonomist Romano Alquati suggested that the
movements of working class struggles could be analysed as constituting a network, not just
regionally or nationally, but on the international level. This network, he proposed,
possessed both vertical and horizontal articulations:
. . . vertical according to the organisation of the class at points within and
against the capitalist circuit of production and reproduction; horizontal
according to the geographical-territorial distribution and linkage of these
movements within and against capitalist accumulation.50
In one sense, the structure of the network was given by the capitalist organisation of
production against which it fought, but,
the information passing from the apex to the base of the hierarchy . . . does
not correspond to that passing in the opposite direction. In other words, the
network of the class struggle, like capital, has its own operational
information, its own mechanisms for checking and controlling, but the
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process based on hierarchical command of capitalist accumulation is turned
upside down.51
This combined vertical-horizontal network of struggles has "nodal points" of
interconnection; "points of maximum accumulation of information and greatest direct
combination of different moments of the anticapitalist struggle." From these poles "the
operational information of struggle is radiated. “ Such communication about "forms, goals,
content, organisation of struggle" was, Alquati said,
. . . an indirect, mediated and complex process, operating through a whole
series of mechanisms . . . a form of telecommunication which transcends
physical spatial contacts between the nodes that are in communication.52
Today, of course, these connections are often not just metaphorically but literally
telecommunicational. And amongst the many mechanisms by which it proceeds, a crucial
one has been the creation of various networks of autonomous media. The emergence of
these networks in North America was outlined in the Chapter Five. But a crucial ingredient
of `the other globalisation' has been the eruption of similar experiments across the planet.
Indeed, a feature of contemporary struggle is the degree to which many of the crucial
"nodal points" from which the "operational information of struggle is radiated " are to be
found in the former Second and Third Worlds.
In the Third World, the creation of autonomous communication networks were, of
course integral to anti-colonial struggle; one has only to think of Frantz Fanon's
observations on the role of radio in the Algerian civil war.53 The residual impetus of these
319
revolutionary experiments propelled the New World Information and Communications
Order, the Third World challenge to US global media dominance. But this complex
movement was partly harnessed to the interests of post-colonial state and media elites. Its
critique of media imperialism was thus compromised by a certain willingness to overlook
internal repressions and exclusions. However, over the last two decades, as national
governments submit to privatisation and deregulation, the focus of information activism in
the South has largely shifted from such a state-centred media base towards a proliferation
of independent, grassroots, initiatives, arising from sectors in struggle with both local and
global rulers: Brazilian street television, video training for Korean trades unionists,
township-based South African community radio stations. These media often provide the
vital channels for movements opposing capitalist globalisation within neighbourhood,
regional and national boundaries.
The political potential of these forms of activism was strikingly, though
ambiguously revealed, in the fall of state socialism in the ex-Second World. Here the radio
activism of Solidarnosc, the rivulets of samizdat, underground music and media permeating
Eastern Europe, the role of computer networks and radio stations media relaying news of
the Stalinist Moscow coup, all played an important part in undermining the rule of the
commissars. A similar, but more complex dynamic emerged in the deadly dance of
subversion and surveillance surrounding satellite-borne images of events at Tienanman
Square. The relative friendliness of the Western media (not to mention the CIA) toward
these revolts makes their success a special case. Yet some would argue that they
demonstrate a vernacular familiarity with technology and a popular capacity for the self-
organisation of communications technology potentially inimical to either state or corporate
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management, and which can be as effectively turned against neoliberal globalism as
Stalinist isolation.
Others are more sceptical. Against hopeful prognoses about international
democratic empowerment through information, they identify the formidable global
limitations to and inequalities in access to the means of communication in a world where
forty per cent of the population is without electricity and sixty-five per cent have never
used a telephone. In an essay tellingly entitled, "World Wide Wedge," Peter Golding notes
that "the terrain occupied by communication goods and facilities is a hilly one, marked by
soaring peaks of advantage and dismal valleys of privation."54 He points out that all
information industries are very heavily concentrated in the developed world. This holds
from newspaper publishing, where half the world's production is in the industrialised
West, to telecommunications, with more phone lines in Tokyo or New York than in the
whole of sub-Saharan Africa. These inequities are even more marked in computer-
mediated communications, which are, as Golding notes, "not so world wide after all,"
since large portions of Africa, Asia and Latin America currently lack all but minimal
connections to the Internet.55 These problems are compounded with inequities in the
availability of technical training, and with problems around translation for digital media, in
which English remains the lingua franca. The implication of such analysis is that the
potential for information activism remains limited to a few relatively privileged zones.
These objections are substantial enough to damn any naive political optimism. But
they are not sufficient to dismiss the possibilities for a significant enlargement in the
"network of struggles." Capital is, for its own reasons, diffusing and cheapening access to
many information technologies. The inevitably socialised aspects of communications--its
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broadcast and network aspects, which increase in value according to the number of
recipients and participants--means that in many areas business is working very fast to
extend the reach of its circulatory apparatus: AT & T Submarine systems aims to complete
Africa One, the fibre optic undersea cable that will create a communications ring around
the continent, by the year 2000. Televisions, transistors and walkmans are already
available in areas without schools, running water or medical care.56 More of this distorted
universalism can be anticipated.
More importantly, extreme pessimism about global access to communication
resources underestimates the ingenuity of the various communities appropriating these
technologies for their own purposes. Movements that would seem at the furthest remove
from high-tech, such as those of the Mayan peasants in Chiapas, or Indian farmers fighting
multinational seed patenting, or the Kayapo and other indigenous peoples in the Amazon
opposing World Bank development, are interfacing advanced communication networks and
highly traditional forms of mobilisation.57 They are constructing hybrids of pre- and post-
industrial communication forms. I have seen film of the village-by-village oral education
used by the campaigns of Indian farmers and peasants against GATT. These films were
brought to North America by Canadian organic farmers, themselves involved in opposition
to agribusiness, who in turn cull and relay information about these companies via the
Internet to university-based members of the Indian movement.58 This sort of interaction
constructs patterns of activism that defy prediction.
Further, the transfer of technical expertise and experiences in the establishment of
counter-communications is itself becoming a focus of political organising. The transfer of
old computers from North to South, for example, has become a commonplace of
322
international solidarity activities. These global connections, both on a North/South and
South/South axis are taking organisational form. Alternative radio activists have formed the
World Association of Community Broadcasters (AMARC).59 International associations of
video activists and producers such as Video Tierre Monde and Videazimut are
experimenting with circulation of videos via broadcast and cable networks, independent
distribution circuits and formal and informal networks.60 While the largest computer of the
Association for Progressive Communications is located in Silicon Valley, it has partner
networks in Nicaragua, Brazil, Ecuador, Uruguay, Russia, Australia, the United Kingdom,
Canada, Sweden and Germany, affiliates from Vanuata to Zimbabwe, subscribers in ninety-
five countries, and runs projects aimed specifically at facilitating the computer networking
of peace, human rights, ecological and labour organisations in underdeveloped countries.61
Out of these activities horizontal linkages between various "nodes of struggle" are
now being made on a very global basis. They include both the transfer of technical know-
how and equipment and the relay of political analysis, discussion and support. Microwatt
broadcasters from California assist Haitian activists set up radio stations in Port au Prince;
video activists in Vancouver draw on the lessons of popular education from Nicaragua;
British motorway protesters at Newbury receive faxes of support from Ogoniland in
Nigeria, while environmental activists in Europe deluge Shell offices with email protesting
the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa. This is the communicational weave of recomposition. Let
us look at some of its patterns.
 Modem Solidarity
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Through globalisation, capital attempts to directly pit First against Second and Third
World workers, undermining the wages and conditions of the former via the immiseration
of the latter. However, this paradoxically opens the way to a reverse logic in which
workers of the one-time metropolis, losing the position of relative privilege that  gave them
a partial stake in capitalism's international system, acquire an interest in raising the living
standards of those in previously peripheral zones. Northern workers might--and often do--
attempt to insulate themselves from globalisation by traditional forms of protectionism. But
this strategy depends upon business support, at the very time when multinational capital has
decisively rejected such an option. An alternative is for (ex) First World workers to seek
alliances with their counterparts elsewhere in the world. Over the period of capitalist
global restructuring the slogan, "When they win, we win," has begun to be heard within the
most progressive sectors of US and European trades unionism, and there has appeared a
tentative web of connections between metropolitan and peripheral labour.62
Instances include the ten-year solidarity campaign by US trades union and church
groups supporting the occupation of a Coca Cola plant in Guatemala city; networks of
international sugar workers formed around issues of land reform and crop diversification;
autoworkers' conferences involving US, European, Malaysian, Brazilian, Japanese, and
South African delegates; US-Japan worker-to-worker meetings in the computer industry;
South African unionists painting murals for striking Minnesota meatpackers fighting an
apartheid-implicated employer; West Virginia steelworkers forging links with Swiss,
Dutch and Eastern European unions and green movements to beat their multinational
employer; the international connections spun amongst maritime labour around a Liverpool
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dockers’ strike; and the burgeoning networks of transnational support amongst female
homeworkers, discussed in the next section.63
Reviewing such initiatives amongst US labour in the late 1980s, Kim Moody
suggested that their strengths included an activist orientation and the bypassing of
bureaucracies in favour of direct communication among militants. Their corresponding
weaknesses were lack of resources and frequent suspect status of participants within their
own unions.64 A decade or so later, these obstacles are far from dissolved. But such
projects of international solidarity have--largely under the impact of free trade agreements
such as NAFTA--become increasingly common. They turn not only on person-to-person
contact, but also on communication via film, video, fax, and computer networks.
In a series of important articles, Peter Waterman has analysed the role of
communications in forging the new labour internationalism, focusing particularly on
labour's growing involvement in computer mediated communications.65 By the mid-1990s
this had produced two major networks, the US based Labornet and the European Geonet
devoted to union matters, and a number of activist conferences, in locations from
Manchester to Moscow. This labour interest in computerisation, Waterman says, arises
largely from the obvious need of trades unions facing multinational corporations to possess
communication capacities matching those of their managerial antagonist. Increasingly, such
unions use large-scale databases to track information on companies' financial status, health
and safety regulations, and collective bargaining practices; email for internal
communications and solidarity appeals; and bulletin boards for membership orientation
and discussion. But while such networks facilitate the conduct of traditional trades union
activities on a larger scale, with greater speed, Waterman observes that their operation
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also often replicates the classic limitations of business unionism; centralised control, a
purely corporate basis of organisation, and narrow or non-existent political aims.
However, he goes on to suggest that in Europe, over the 1980s, a new, more
expansive approach to modem solidarity began to emerge. This resulted from the
interaction of international trade union organisations and a loose ensemble of radical
activists, NGOs, communication specialists and researchers, whose base lay not so much
in the European unions as in a variety of Third World collectivities. While the perspective
of on-line unionists from the core tended to be pragmatic and utilitarian, those from the
periphery were more innovative and experimental, opening up "alternative visions and
utopian prospects."66
These wider visions included the use of networks in alliance building between
unions and other social movements, recognising differences in needs and skills amongst the
various potential participants, and emphasising improved communication as a component
of inter- and intra-organisational democracy. As representative of this broader style of on-
line solidarity, Waterman cites examples such as South Africa's WorkNet, developed by
the alternative press in the anti-apartheid struggle and subsequently used by trades union,
church, media, and housing movements; the Asia Labour Monitor Resource Centre, started
by radical church activists in Hong Kong on the basis of "US computer familiarity and ever
cheaper East-Asian computers," to circulate information about worker struggles in China,
Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong; Mujer a Mujer, a collective of Mexican, US,
Canadian and Caribbean women's groups representing waged and unwaged female labour
who use on-line communication in their transcontinental opposition to neoliberal
restructuring.67
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One particularly telling example involves Glasnet, the Moscow affiliate of the
Association of Progressive Communication. In the second Moscow coup of October 1993,
where Yeltsinite forces of free market capitalism re-repressed democracy, three members
of the independent Russian Party of Labour, including author Boris Kargilatsky, were
arrested by police, charged with planning to attack a radio station, systematically beaten,
and threatened with death. A criminal released from jail told the wife of one of the
prisoners, who contacted an Australian correspondent for the Green Left Weekly, who in
turn reached a Russian union officer with access to Glasnet, who sent an international
email alert on a series of computer conferences. "Within hours the police station was
inundated with calls" Kargarlitsky writes:
We were watching from the cell . . . One of the first was from Japan. The
police didn't seem able to believe it. After that the calls seemed to be
coming from everywhere--there were quite a few from the Bay Area in the
United States.68
Email attention was reinforced by the arrival of a Moscow TV crew from the program
"The individual and the law." Within hours the detainees were released and the charges
dropped. Waterman comments that "through the concrete and steel" of state socialism and
"out of the shit and blood of an increasingly globalised information capitalism", there
"appears to bloom one flower of global solidarity--an electronic one."69
As he admits, labour's electronic networking is barely nascent, directly involving
only a relatively low number of specialists. While it has had some manifest successes--in
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pressuring states to free imprisoned militants, in providing negotiators timely access to
strategic information--it is far from matching, let alone beating, the power that business has
discovered in cyberspace. Nonetheless, he argues that its potential for reorienting workers'
organisations is significant. Drawing on the formulations of media theorist Fred Stangelaar,
he suggests that the realisation of these possibilities depends on labour computer networks
becoming a relay in "spiral flows" of alternative communication that both laterally connect
a wide range of oppositional groups, and vertically heighten their degree of co-ordination
and support.70 Given this condition, Waterman suggests computer networking could become
a vital element in the constitution of what he calls a "fifth international"--a transnational
connection of oppositional groupings that  does not, like the four previous socialist
Internationals rest on the hierarchical directives of a centralised vanguard party, but rather
arises from the transverse communications of multiplicitous movements. Waterman's
account corresponds closely to the autonomist concept of the circulation of struggles. Let us
examine some further turns of the spiral.
Electronic Boycotts
Movements contesting global capitalisation extend beyond the immediate workplace, and
engage corporate power in the sphere not just of production, but of consumption. This
manifests in a number of ways--adbusting, cultural jamming, media piracy--but is perhaps
best exemplified in the growing number of transnational boycott campaigns.71
Groundbreaking instances of this tactic include the boycotts against Nestle's infant
formulae, South African wines and Chilean grapes. Recently, these examples have been
widely emulated by human rights, feminist, environmental and labour groups. Targets
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include clear-cutting by forest companies from British Columbia to Sarawak; Indian
carpets made by child labour; US coffee-bars supplied by super-exploited Guatemalan
plantation-workers; toys produced in the super-hazardous factories of China, Hong Kong
and Thailand; and North American clothing chains selling garments manufactured in
Taiwanese-owned sweatshops located in El Salvador.
In many ways, capital's own globalising momentum opens the door to such counter-
attacks. By making the effects of sweated labour and intensified environmental destruction
reverberate world-wide, planetary corporations unintentionally prompt the making of
connections between conditions at the point of production and decisions at the point of
sale. The heightened combativeness of the international market, the consequent corporate
dependence on image and public relations, and, above all, the very communication
networks vital to global production and global advertising, have made business vulnerable
to challenges in the world marketplace. Thus, for example, a campaign waged by labour,
religious and other groups across North America against the exploitation of sweated labour
by the sportswear giant Nike could focus on the fact that in 1992 the company paid
basketball superstar Michael Jordan more for his promotional efforts than the combined
yearly income of 30,000 young Indonesian women who toiled to piece together the
sneakers he advertised. The same campaign also used the Internet to co-ordinate
international global `phone zaps' of Nike headquarters.72
An even more striking example is that of the British `McLibel 2.' Two British
activists were sued by McDonald's hamburger chain for distributing leaflets denouncing the
corporation's low-wage labour practices, child-targeted advertising, involvement in
rainforest destruction, animal welfare record, and promotion of unhealthy diet. By
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assembling a volunteer defence of international experts that substantiated their accusations
they turned the five-year civil trial--the longest in British history--into a public relations
fiasco for the company. Worldwide `McLibel' support groups have distributed over 1.5
million copies of the original leaflets, as well as sponsoring numerous demonstrations and
disruptions at McDonald's across the world.
They have also created McSpotlight, a World Wide Web site combining text,
graphics, video and audio materials in a thoroughgoing critique of the corporation. The
Guardian newspaper reported that this site "claimed to be the most comprehensive source
of information on a multinational corporation ever assembled--and that doesn't sound like
an exaggeration."73 McSpotlight, in addition to documenting the McLibel trial and the
claims of the original leaflet, contains news of other anti-corporate campaigns and
discussions of alternatives to food production by multinational corporations. It reported
190,000 hits in its first week, email responses at a rate of forty a day, and was widely
reported by the mainstream press, further discomforting its corporate adversary.
The use of new information channels has also been important in throwing the light
of public attention on the shadow-work of domestic labour. This has been particularly
telling in the highly image-conscious fashion industries, where contracting and
subcontracting allow major corporations to distance themselves from slave-like conditions
of production. Here feminist organisations have built alliances both among the
internationally dispersed home workers and between these labourers and the shoppers--
themselves predominantly women--who purchase the products they make.
In doing so they have availed themselves of the most up-to-date means of
communication. Thus on the World Wide Web one can find the well-appointed home pages
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of organisations such as the Clean Clothes Campaign, a movement started in 1990 by Dutch
women supporting striking Filipino garment workers in the Bataan Free Trade Zone. Its
web site carries information about homeworkers unions and support organisations, strikes
in Lesotho, Nicaragua, Vietnam, Egypt, Jamaica, Sri Lanka and California, discussions of
the strengths and weaknesses of corporate `codes of conduct' and `social clauses' in free
trade agreements, news of boycotts and information about other ways shoppers can support
workers, for example through the use of "clean clothes scorecards."74
Such sites sometimes contain self-reflection on the means of communication. For
example, the "North South Dignity of Labor Web Site," run by Centre Nuovo Modello di
Silvuppo in Italy, at once affirms the use of computer networks in co-ordinating and
distributing information of world wide scope and recognises the limitations of access to
such technology. It affirms the continued importance of more traditional means such as mail
and face-to face-meeting, and ends by asserting a strategy of parallel channels: “Each of
these means is, in its own way, irreplaceable, because it makes possible something that all
the others do not. Therefore we shall go on using them all.”
This is not the place to analyse all the strengths and pitfalls of boycott tactics. They
can, without careful agreement amongst the different parties involved, lead to disastrous
contradictions.75 But the experiments described here do seem significant. They show
electronic communications deployed to link labour, ecological and feminist perspectives,
connecting oppositions to capital across the fields of production, consumption and
reproduction. Aimed at specific products, they nevertheless inevitably prompt questioning
of the consumerism that is the complement to capital's doctrine of endless work. And they
do so by mobilising withdrawals of consumption power over the same global terrain on
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which capital attempts to stimulate it, taking the same technological means corporations
deploy to co-ordinate exploitation and depredation in lonely and underreported places and
turning them into instruments of exposure and contestation.
Cross-Border/On-Line
The scope of oppositional networking exceeds resistance to specific corporations.
Capitalist globalisation entails the subordination of state policy and public spending to
international financial flows and treaty obligations. Consequently, opposition to it, whether
insurrections against structural adjustment programs or mobilisations against free trade
agreements, tend to catalyse the formation of broad movements involving diverse sectors of
the working class with interests in resisting privatisation, deregulation and austerity.
Further, the transnational logic of capital gives a powerful impetus to the connection of
these revolts in regional and multinational organisations. However, such coalitions require
the resolution amongst potential participants of real contradictions and conflicts of interest
resulting from capital's international division of labour. They thus depend on
communicational channels for information, discussion, and debate.
This was very apparent in struggles around the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA). When the final draft of this treaty was announced by the governments
of the USA, Mexico and Canada in August 1992, it was rapidly apparent that an agreement
that  gave capital unlimited mobility across borders, pitted labour forces in direct
competition with one another, and dismantled a wide range of public services would
encounter resistance in all three countries.76 However, co-ordination of a trilateral
opposition faced serious obstacles. In the US and Canada the anti free-trade movement
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often tended toward a national-chauvinist protectionism. Development of an alternative
direction partly depended on contact with and understanding of Mexican social movements.
Such efforts would, however, run contrary to both the corporate media's pro-NAFTA
predisposition and neglect of issues in the South, and the Salinas' regime's state control
over the Mexican news flows.
In fact the NAFTA debate spawned a wide variety of alternative communications
across the Canadian, US and Mexican border. Visits, personal contacts, conferences, tours,
and transborder exchanges, particularly visits to maquiladoras by US and Canadian
workers, became frequent amongst activists. While there were important organisational
nodes for these transfers, they proceeded from a multiplicity of points in complex and
interweaving paths. This circulation of struggles and perspectives was not only carried by
on the ground contacts but was also made through newsletters and journals, videos,
alternative radio and television broadcasts, and computer networks. These provided the
media for the discussion of strategy and tactics, reports on conferences, announcement of
cross-border exchanges, organising efforts and human rights appeals.
 Focussing again on computer networks, John Brenner and Fredrick Howard have
both made inventories of the anti-NAFTA organisations using online communication.77
These include the North American Worker-To-Worker Network, supporting the
connections, within and without official union frameworks, between US and Mexican
workers in the automobile, telecommunications and electronics sectors. They also number
feminist organisations, such as El Paso's La Mujer Obrera, fighting to improve the
conditions of women workers in the border regions, and Mexico City-based Mujer a
Mujer; green organisations, tracking pollutant flows across three borders, or funnelling
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information from North American sources to Mexican opponents of medfly spraying in
Chiapas; and a variety of US and Mexican-based services that  specialised in
disseminating critical analysis of the free trade negotiations.78
The anti-NAFTA coalitions, while mobilising a depth of opposition entirely
unexpected by capital, failed in their immediate objectives. But the transcontinental
dialogues that  emerged checked--though by no means eliminated--the chauvinist element in
North American opposition to free trade. The movement created a powerful pedagogical
crucible for cross-sectoral and cross-border organising. And it opened pathways for future
connections, including electronic ones, that  were later effectively mobilised by the
Zapatista uprising and in continuing initiatives against maquilladora exploitation.
While the intensity of transborder networking catalysed by NAFTA was perhaps
exceptional, both because the treaty so sharply posed issues of capital mobility and
because of North America's situation as a centre of communications technologies, the
phenomena is by no means unique. Thus, if we turn from the Americas to Asia, we can see
a similar process unfolding, albeit in a more diffuse way. Over the last five years, India
has been systematically opened up to the world market under a New Economic Policy,
adopted under pressure from the IMF and World Bank.79 In 1992, an estimated 15 million
workers participated in a one-day nation-wide industrial strike to protest this process.80
Resistance has taken a number of forms--some fundamentalist and fascist, such as the
Bharatiya Janata Party, others of a broadly left nature.81 Amongst these latter there has
emerged a variety of transnational alliances, solidarities and contacts with oppositional
movements both in other Asian countries and in the North. These connections flow through
multiplicitous channels of oral, written, film, video, and computer communication.
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Thus we find world-spanning alliances between Northern environmentalists and
Indian `tribals' and urban intellectuals opposing the World Bank's Narmada dam project--
fed by a circulation of films, videos and email; Indian peasant movements fighting GATT's
intellectual-property clauses visited by Canadian organic farmers, who carry with them
books analysing the activities of multinational seed corporations, return with films and
videos of these same corporation's offices sacked by million-strong demonstrations, and
keep in touch by e-mail; Internet solidarity appeals from Indian workers occupying jute
factories; Northern NGOs electronically-scanning data banks for details of commercial
plans to patent plant and animal species and transmitting the news back to the resistance
organisations of Indian, Thai and Sri Lankan farmers; and Indian labour and human rights
organisations sending delegates and films to North American trades unions supporting
boycotts of Walmart megastores selling carpets made by child labour.82
These initiatives proceed without central focus. They constitute a diffuse
coalescence of micro-activisms contesting the macro-logic of capitalist globalisation. I
would suggest that similar constellations could probably be found forming at virtually any
point on the planet. They exist as a sort of fine mist of international activism, composed of
innumerable droplets of contact and communication, condensing in greater or lesser
densities and accumulations, dispersing again, swirling into unexpected formations and
filaments, blowing over and around the barriers dividing global workers. In the next
section we will consider some of the thunder and lightning that accompanies these clouds.
Netwars and Anti-Wars
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At its cutting edge, capitalist globalisation means war--not only the immediate violence of
military attack, whether in the form of imperial invasion or low-intensity conflicts, but also
the sustained social and environmental violence of starvation, social disintegration, and
deprivation that in turn sets the scene for ethnic rivalries and internal conflict.
Consequently, the circulation of struggles between a multiplicity of movements---trades
unionists, feminists, ecologists, indigenous people--has increasingly taken the form of a
front arrayed in the name of peace: life against death, a refusal to accept the sentence that
says what is not profitable must be erased. The great international mobilisation of the anti-
nuclear movement of the 1980s, which was coloured by the particular interest of the
inhabitants of the North in avoiding the punctual holocaust of nuclear armageddon, has in a
sense broadened and deepened to become a demand, enunciated from a wide variety of
sites, for the end of the everyday holocausts proliferating all over the planet. This
perspective is not strictly pacifist, since it usually entails recognition of the right of
resistance against exploitation and degradation. But it seeks to block the infinitely greater
exterminatory violence brought to bear on such revolts, in order to defend a space for the
creation of alternative social options. The new counter-networks transmit an old slogan:
"Bread and Peace."
Communication is, again, vital--for exposing the actual or potential atrocities that
capital prefers to have executed in secret. The most striking example is of course the
uprising of the Zapatista Army of National Liberation against the Mexican government in
1994--a revolt that  specifically denounced capitalist globalisation as the culmination of a
centuries-long dispossession of the people of Chiapas. In an important analysis, Harry
Cleaver has suggested that the success of the EZLN in avoiding the normal fate of peasant
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revolts in Mexico--outright massacre--was partly due to their weaving of an "electronic
fabric of struggle."83 Despite the Zedillo regime's control of Mexico's mainstream media,
the EZLN was able to rapidly disseminate its own communiques not only within Mexico
but globally. This was accomplished largely through the network of electronic contacts
established via the Internet during the NAFTA campaigns. EZLN documents and news
reports flashed into conferences and lists on networks such as Peacenet and Usenet. They
were then rediffused, accompanied by additional information, analysis and discussion from
those familiar with the situation in Chiapas, into other parts of the Internet, and from thence
into left-wing newspapers, magazines and radio stations, and, eventually, into the
mainstream press.
This "communicative action" then passed into "physical action," not only in a
world-wide series of protests at Mexican embassies and government offices, but in an
influx of Zapatista supporters--journalists, human rights observers, delegations--into
Chiapas.84 This occurred in a context where NAFTA had made Mexico an exemplar of
capitalist development and an object of intense scrutiny by international investors. Cleaver
suggests that, together with the many protests within Mexico, it was this focusing of global
attention that  made it impossible for the Zedillo government to impose a purely military
solution, and compelled it to switch to cease-fire and mediated negotiations.
After the initial moments of the revolt, the "electronic fabric of struggle" was
strengthened with new threads. Videos made in Chiapas have gone North: microwatt
broadcasting has gone South, as radio-activists from Free Radio Berkeley assist Zapatistas
and local autonomists set up their own micro-watt transmitters. The translation of entire
books of EZLN documents has been co-ordinated in cyberspace, and the Zapatistas have
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established there own "Ya Basta" World Wide Web site.85 And these electronic flows have
in turn attracted interest in the encuentros organised by the EZLN with the explicit aim of
stimulating global opposition to neoliberalism--international meetings whose discussions
have then in turn been relayed out across airwaves and networks.
For capital and its advisors, such activity is a threat. This was acknowledged by
some of its own analysts. In the aftermath of the Gulf War slaughter, two RAND
corporation analysts, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, had written a paper suggesting that
the conflicts of the future would take the form of "cyberwars" and "netwars."86 Cyberwar,
waged at a purely military level might "be to the twenty first century what blitzkrieg was to
the twentieth."87 It would be a type of conflict "in which neither mass nor mobility will
decide outcomes; instead, the side that knows more, that can disperse the fog of war yet
enshroud an adversary in it, will enjoy decisive advantages."88 Netwar is a broader
concept of "societal-level ideational conflicts waged in part through internetted modes of
communication" and entails" trying to disrupt, damage, or modify what a target population
knows or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it":
it may focus on public or elite opinion, or both . . . involve public
diplomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political
and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media,
infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote
dissident or opposition movements across computer networks89
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Cyberwar and netwar are "forms of war about `knowledge,' about who knows what, when,
where, and why."90 Both "revolve around information and communications" and imply that
in future conflicts "whoever masters the network form will gain major advantages.91
Shortly after the outbreak of the Zapatista revolt, Ronfeldt was interviewed on the
situation in Mexico. Although in his earlier writings he had focussed on information
technologies as instruments of inter-state conflict, he had also noted that netwar applies to
"low intensity conflict " by "non-state actors, such as terrorists, drug cartels, or black
market proliferators of weapons of mass destruction. " By "making it possible for diverse,
dispersed actors to communicate, consult, co-ordinate, and operate together across greater
distances, and on the basis of more and better information than ever" netwar might create a
terrain favourable to what would otherwise be small and conventionally weak
organisations. Ronfeldt now emphasised that social activists were on the cutting edge of
the new "network" system of organising. Noting the use by Zapatista's and other opponents
of Zedillo of Internet, fax and video, he suggested that;
At a time when the political and economic crisis has created widespread
disaffection . . . network style organising will enable the opposition to
overcome its traditional factionalism. The greatest threat to the government
could be hundreds or thousands of independent groups united in their
opposition but accepting of each other's autonomy.92
Although the "decentralisation" of this oppositional force meant it could not "take national
power," Ronfeldt suggested its activities could make Mexico "ungovernable";
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The risk for Mexico is not an old-fashioned civil war or another social
revolution . . . The risk is social netwar. The country that produced the
prototype social revolution of the 20th century may now be giving rise to
the prototype social netwar of the 21st century.93
What Ronefldt calls "netwars" I would rather call "anti-wars"--the mobilisation of
worldwide communications to hold open spaces within which experiments in autonomy
can escape extermination.
Three Examples
Subcommandante Marcos, inputting communiques to a laptop plugged into the lighter
socket of an old pickup truck, has by now become something of a mythical figure both for
the left and its enemies. But the communicational logic demonstrated by the Zapatista's is
not limited to Chiapas. I will point briefly to some other examples, from Asia, Africa,
Europe and the South Pacific.
One is East Timor. Here, until a very few years ago, the Indonesian government's
invasion and genocide could proceed in quiet obscurity thanks to the huge interests of
multinational capital in the development of one of Asia's most populous and resource-rich
markets. In the early 1990s this changed, largely due to three events: the filming by British
television journalists of the massacre of student demonstrators in Dilli; the circulation of
the independently-produced film, "Manufacturing Consent," giving central place to Noam
Chomsky's analysis of mainstream media silences about Timor; and the establishment of
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several computer news groups, email lists and web sites giving information about the
situation on the island.94
This dissemination of news and analysis has encouraged a proliferation of
international actions in support of the Timorese resistance, including civil disobedience
and sabotage in England against an aerospace company supplying fighter jets to Indonesia;
North American student protests against university co-operation with the Suharto regime;
and contacts between Timorese resistance leaders and US workers in Charleston, Illinois,
striking against a company with commercial links to the Indonesian government.95
Furthermore, the illumination of the Timorese situation has spilled over to shed light on
other human rights abuses in Indonesia, including the repression of trades unions and
students, and the implication of mining corporations such as Freeman McMoRyan in the
ravaging of Irian Jaya.96
The second case is that of Nigeria. Here again, there is a long history of struggle
against the military regime whose self-styled "wasting operations" have swept across
pollution drenched landscapes, protecting the operations of Shell Oil from a population
whose living standards have dropped twenty-five per cent in the last twenty-five years.97
And again, this struggle was shrouded in a handy--from the point of Shell and General
Abacha--oblivion. Until the execution of Ken Saro Wiwa and nine other activists. For Saro
Wiwa's role as an author and television playwright placed him at the centre of a web of
cultural and communicational networks. As these transmitted the news of his death, they
stimulated an unprecedented volume of mainstream analysis of the Nigerian situation. This
provided the opportunity for international solidarity groups to set underway major
demonstrations and boycotts against Shell, actions that  were publicised and organised
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through alternative networks of computer, print, and film.98 This activity in turn built
pressure for other campaigns driving for trade sanctions, and all rolled together to create
an unprecedented attention to the cost in Nigerian blood of corporate oil.
In Timor and Nigeria, unlike Chiapas, this flow of information has brought no
immediate lessening of horrors. But it has resulted in an intensified circulation of struggles.
It is, I emphasise, resistance on the ground, in the streets--the willingness of people to fight
and die--that lies at the base of these situations. But when the cries of the wounded, the
crackle of machine gun fire, and the pop of tear gas enter into global communication
networks, they can create a series of feedback effects and noise very unpleasant to capital.
For business went global to find stability and predictability. In search of these goals it will
turn a blind eye to, and pay for, unspeakable atrocities. But when such atrocities become
visible, capital's very mobility can destabilise its own operations. Facing imponderable
risks--the costs of public relations, the consequences of international protests, the rising
morale of the local resistors--money sometimes finds it easier to migrate than fight,
relocating production elsewhere or evaporating into financial speculation.
 And this volatility can create difficulties for the local authorities whose task it is to
maintain the conditions of accumulation at gunpoint. On some recent occasions, the flight of
private funds from `hot spots' has created the need for massive intervention by the highest
levels of capitalist organisation. In Mexico, partly as a result of the war in Chiapas, and in
Russia, partly as a result of war in Chechnya, global financial institutions have had to
siphon in billions of dollars to uphold the regimes they are depending on to secure the open
market. The funds available for such rescue operations are vast, but not limitless; this is a
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game that that can be repeated once or twice simultaneously, but perhaps not five or ten
times.
Let us give one other example of oppositional networking. In 1995, France's
government announced an austerity plan aimed at meeting the Maastricht treaty's
requirements for European financial union. The response was a four-week strike-wave that
put millions of French workers, students and citizens into the streets in what has been
termed --a tad Eurocentrically--"the first revolt against globalisation."99 These domestic
actions coincided with an international outcry against French nuclear testing in the Pacific,
which included mass rioting in Tahiti and other islands in the region, world-wide
demonstrations outside embassies and airline offices, and a boycott call against French
wines. A few months later, the shipment of French nuclear wastes across European borders
precipitated three days of pitched battle between German protestors and police.
The link between these apparently disparate events was made in a novel way on the
computer list "counter@francenet.fr" that  circulated news of the strike. Here an Italian
group, Strano Network, proposed a "net' strike" ("greve en reseau") against French
government internet sites, to be conducted by inundating them with hits to the point of
paralysis. The proposal reads:
The French government shows a total contempt for its people, for the
international community and for ordinary people who want to see their
children grow up in a better world. It carries out nuclear tests in the Pacific.
It continues to use "civilian nuclear power." It maintains its projects of
"social reconstruction" despite demonstrations of massive opposition. For
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these reasons we intend to take away (although partially, and for a limited
period) from the institutions of the French government the privilege which
all the powerful--the lords of war, famine and social injustice--seek: access
to the ever more powerful means of communication and the channels of
information, those same privileges which are denied to the vast majority of
the global population.100
The proposal stirred some online debate about its utility or desirability as a tactic, but
Strano Network persisted with its initiative, and later issued a report claiming the
participation of "several thousands of strikers" and success in shutting down numerous
French government sites.101
The significance of the strike does not lie so much in its immediate effectiveness--a
point on which the critics of Strano Networks are probably right--as in the linkages it
made, tying together in a world-wide electronic bulletin the austerity inflicted on French
workers and the nuclear fallout imposed on Pacific islanders, pointing to the value placed
by neoliberalism on military as against civilian expenditures, and to its disregard for
popular opinion, global or domestic. Connecting the marchers in the streets of Rouen, the
rioters in Papeete, and, prefiguratively, the German anti-nuclear protestors, it thus created
an optic within which the French government's partial retreat from its domestic cutbacks
and its abandonment of nuclear testing could be grasped as twin victories against a
common enemy. The logic of France's Juppe government and its business and financial
backers is that of capitalist globalisation. The logic of Strano network, of the French
strikers, and the German and Pacific Island rioters, is that of the other globalisation.
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The globalisation of Others & the Other globalisation
In an earlier era, prospects of breaking through the net of the world market were often
thought to lie in the piecemeal withdrawal or disassociation of liberated zones, which
would succeed first in peripheral zones, and gradually surround and destabilise the
capitalist centre. This concept was given classic expression in Samir Amin's theory of
"delinking"-often interpreted, and in some cases implemented, as a program of nationalist
autarky.102 In today's situation, where the integration of economic activity has reached an
entirely new level and the positions of metropolis and periphery become profoundly
intermingled, such concepts become increasingly problematic. At the very least, it is
paradoxically apparent that any localised delinking can only succeed as a moment in a
series of highly linked, mutually supportive regional and transnational projects of
withdrawal.
In the current context a more promising line of initiative is what Jeremy Brecher
and Tim Costello call " globalisation from below."103 This refers to the activities of
"peoples transnational coalitions," formed across national boundaries by social movements
aiming to fulfil mutually complementary supportive objectives for workers in different
parts of the world.104Brecher and Costello suggest that such movements will come to
oppose the “downward harmonisation” of wages, social wages, human rights and
environmental standards effected by free trade agreements and financial discipline with
demands for “harmonisation upward”; they will have as a priority the democratisation of
economic institutions, and be oriented toward the creation of "a multilevel one-world
economy (with) regulation above and below the level of the nation state, and powers
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devolved downward and upward."105 Such proposals are often presented within a reformist
perspective that obscures the depth of confrontation with capital that their realisation
would require. Nevertheless, " globalisation from below" seems to roughly correspond to
many of the tendencies in transnational struggles identified in this chapter.
I have suggested that the increasing circulation of struggles during the crisis of the
1960s and 70s compelled capital to a fundamental reorganisation, one which broke down
the previous `triplanetary' segregation of the globe into First, Second and Third Worlds.
The objective of this manoeuvre was to unify and integrate the circuits of profit while
severing and destroying connections amongst the working class, decomposing points of
opposition and unrest from the industrial factory to the jungle paddy field. This process
has, however, unintentionally created the terrain for a new recomposition of oppositional
forces--not least by its fabrication of a world-wide net of communications, a net formed to
facilitate the operations of the market, but increasingly expropriated by oppositional forces
for very different purposes. The result has been to produce not one, but two globalisation
processes --simultaneous, superimposed, interdependent and antagonistic.
The first is capitalist globalisation. Its tendency is to create incredible wealth and
power for the few controlling the flows of international investment and finance;
improvements in living conditions within a persisting context of exploitation for some; and,
for very many, a chaos of immiseration. Celebrated, with partial truth, as the unification of
the planet, this globalisation also carries within itself a lethal acceleration of divisions and
antagonisms. For its mechanism is an intensification of competition within a planetary
market, an intensification of polarities and hierarchies in a `one world' economy, a
relentless setting of labour against itself--a globalisation of `others.'
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The alternative, opposing tendency is that of the world wide counter- movements
confronting transnational capital. As Waterman points out, these movements appear to have
"no international headquarters, no organisation, . . . no obvious terrain of battle"; but
"alternatively, one could say that they have many headquarters, many organisations--and
many terrains, forms and levels of struggle."106 Appearing first as a series of sporadic and
localised neighbourhoods of survival and communities of resistance, these struggles are
generating a series of connections, contacts, coalitions and networks of co-operation. They
aim at the creation of a world space that , rather than being subject to the monologic of
capital, contains within it the conditions for the interaction of diverse ways of living and
organising. This is `the other globalisation.’
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